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Call for Presentations: Technology & Peace Conference (SYP UK)

  • SYP UK Annual Conference // 12th February 2022 // University of Leicester
  • Call for Presentations (pdf) – here

 

Students at SYP conferenceStudent / Young Pugwash (SYP) is a network of students, researchers and younger people interested in a wide range of peace and security issues.…

UK public opinion on ‘First Use’ of nuclear weapons (Oct 2021)

British Pugwash note: Two Thirds of UK Public Opposed to “First Use” of Nuclear Weapons (PDF report here)


The “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” of the United States, released on 3 March 2021, states that the Biden administration will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy, while ensuring that the U.S.…

hypersonic missile

VIDEO: ‘Missile Defence and Strategic Stability in the Hypersonic Age’

This year’s post-AGM Lecture was held on 22nd September.

The title was: ‘Missile Defence and Strategic Stability in the Hypersonic Age’

It was given by Harry Spencer, a postgraduate at University of Birmingham, speaking about his ongoing research with British Pugwash on missile defence systems, hypersonics and strategic stability.…

Trident submarine at Faslane

New research on climate change impacts on nuclear security

British Pugwash is pleased to release newly commissioned research about the potential impacts of climate change on the UK’s nuclear weapons infrastructure.

The report, by Dr Sally Brown from Bournemouth University, is titled ‘Risks of sea-level rise to ports and associated facilities aligning with the Trident programme: A focus on Coulport, Faslane, Barrow-in-Furness and Devonport’.

Note on Nuclear Weapon Announcements in the UK’s Integrated Review of Security (May 2021)

The below is a summary of and link to a commentary by Ambassador Peter Jenkins, Chair of British Pugwash. 

Summary

The United Kingdom government recently announced, in the context of an integrated policy review, that it will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 (from a previous target of no more than 180) and that it will extend its longstanding policy of deliberate ambiguity by no longer making public figures for its operational stockpile, deployed warheads and deployed missiles.…