As noted in a post on this site on 14 March, recent developments in relations between the United States and Europe have prompted President Macron to offer (as he did in 2020) to make France’s nuclear forces available for the defence of Europe. This post touches briefly on some of the issues that lie at the core of that offer.
In an article which appeared in Le Monde on 16 March a former secretary-general in the French ministry of defence and national security, Louis Gautier, suggests that no French government could envisage sharing the manufacture, possession or firing of French nuclear-armed missiles. What is conceivable, he and other commentators believe, is so to define French “vital interests” (which French nuclear weapons are seen as existing to defend) that they extend well beyond the French “hexagon”, resulting in the provision of a nuclear umbrella to other parts of Europe.
The question that then arises is whether some (‘all’ seems inconceivable) European governments would want to avail themselves of the French offer, even if this were to entail leaving it to the French President to decide whether and when to use nuclear weapons in the event of one or more of those umbrella-states coming under attack or threat of attack.
M. Gautier seems to think that some might want to take up the offer, on condition that their “strategic positions” had been fully aligned with those of France, European defence had been “further integrated”, and security doctrines had been fully discussed. Another commentator refers to acceptance of the offer requiring a prior definition of rules of engagement applicable to a range of circumstances.
These suggestions are consistent with what has been the norm in NATO for decades. Technically, only the US President and the British Prime Minister would be in a position to decide whether or not to use the nuclear weapons that are assigned to NATO; but other Allies (notably those on whose territories US nuclear weapons are stored) play a part in nuclear planning, in drafting rules of engagement and in working through all the other business on the Nuclear Planning Group’s agenda.
Another question that has attracted the attention of French commentators is whether France’s nuclear arsenal is large enough – France is believed to possess 280-290 nuclear warheads – adequately to serve the defence needs of other European states. The answer to that question would be largely dependent on the potential uses planned for a Franco-European nuclear force.
A past statement by a British minister suggested that he considered a smaller British force (well under 100 warheads are likely to be operationally deployed at any one time) large enough credibly to deter a Russian nuclear first strike on the United Kingdom. This implies that the existing, larger French force ought to be seen as an adequate Franco-European deterrent. But if France and future European umbrella-states were to adopt a doctrine that envisaged extensive first use of a Franco-European force, to repel a non-nuclear attack, for example, or for a counterforce first strike, a larger French arsenal could well be needed.
In that connection, it seems appropriate to refer to an opinion piece which appeared on the site of Initiatives pour le Desarmament Nucleaire (IDN), a sister organisation of French Pugwash, on 21 May 2024, and in Liberation on 16 May 2024. In it General Bernard Norlain, having reviewed these and other issues, concludes that, in preference to accepting President Macron’s offer, Europeans should expand their conventional capacity to deter conventional aggression:
“What’s needed for Europe to be strategically autonomous in a complex and constantly changing world is not a magic potion but means to face both global and regional security challenges which do not imply the prospect of humanity being destroyed. A European nuclear bomb is not only a false good idea; it could turn out to be a tragic mistake.”
However, acceptance of the French offer could well seem preferable to some other European States seeking to acquire their own nuclear forces, as has been reported to be under debate in Germany and Poland – notably in the Financial Times on 24 March (From Berlin to Tokyo, the fears of a new nuclear arms race).