Report: Ceasefire for Ukraine & Russia
Canadian Pugwash Group Peace Table
27 April 2023

“There is always a time for peace” – Sergio Duarte

Introduction
Concerns were expressed during a November 2022 expert Round Table organized by Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (CNANW) over the potential risk of the Russia-Ukraine war escalating to nuclear war. The Report from that gathering recommended: “Civil society can establish an international forum to coordinate an exchange of views towards a peaceful outcome.”

To follow up, CNANW requested, and Canadian Pugwash Group agreed to take the lead on organizing a discussion of means to achieve a ceasefire to lessen the risks of nuclear war.

Ernie Regehr (a CPG member and author of “Disarming Conflict: Why Peace Cannot Be Won on the Battlefield” agreed to moderate the discussion. Dr. Sylvie Lemieux (CPG member and co-chair CNANW) facilitated the panel.

The four panelists were:

- Prof. Wolfgang Sporrer, Adjunct Professor - Conflict Management, The Hertie School, Berlin, German (OSCE, Minsk Accords),
- Sergio Duarte, former UN High Representative for Disarmament,
- Sergey Batsanov, Russian diplomatic service from 1975 to 1993, former Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, currently Director of the Geneva Office of Pugwash Conferences, and
- Dr. Mariia Levchenko, Peacebuilding Officer with Peace Action, Training and Research Institute of Romania (PATRIR).

Peace Table Process
A war in Europe was said to be unthinkable at the onset of the Twenty-first Century and now, over a year in the making, the war in Ukraine stands as a failure in international diplomacy and a moral stain. But following
the invasion of Ukraine, many States joined one side or another, and declared only victory was now acceptable.

The Peace Table planning committee knew that peace would be more difficult to achieve than a ceasefire. Wars are complex. Therefore, identifying obstacles and their possible mitigation from the different perspectives held by informed speakers was seen as a way to narrow discussion of potential steps.

The program’s two questions were then selected:
Q1. “What are 2-3 obstacles to stopping the war and getting to a ceasefire?”
Q2. “We have identified obstacles to a ceasefire. Which obstacles, if mitigated, would best pave the way to a ceasefire?”

The guest speakers were invited to address these questions with a first round of seven minutes each (for the first question) and a second round of five minutes (for the second question.) A session of 15 minutes was allocated for the panelists to address each other’s points, and finally there followed a session for questions from the invited audience which closed the discussions. The full program, the list of the invited audience members and their questions (not all could be addressed in the provided timeframe) are included in separate annexes.

Peace Table Findings
The following section provides a condensation of major risks, blockages, and considerations for a ceasefire, as perceived by Peace Table participants in April 2023. To simplify, they have been grouped below into four primary categories: CONDITIONS ARE NOT RIPE; OUTSIDE INFLUENCE, ABSENT OPTIONS; and OTHER IDENTIFIED RISKS.

CONDITIONS ARE NOT RIPE FOR A CEASEFIRE

A. War Stalemate - Zero-sum game
There exists a certain level of acceptance of the present level of violence, suffering and destruction. While both sides are "hurting", they are not yet willing to seek compromise. These positions are not compatible with establishing a ceasefire or peace. Many within Ukraine now see a ceasefire as accepting what has been
lost since 2014. But both Russians and Ukrainians may now believe a return to the pre-war status quo is unacceptable.

B. Belief in Victory
Talk of victory continues to fuel the discourses of the warring factions, within the official national discourses, and among those supplying weapons, funding, and other resources. This may persist as long as Ukraine receives weapons and Russia can recruit conscripts.

C. Belief that a ceasefire will lock in war positions
A ceasefire without a detailed plan to follow is feared to be an empty promise that could create worse conditions later. People on both sides assume that current positions claimed on the ground will significantly impact eventual borders, so there is a risk in agreeing to a ceasefire. Negotiations could clarify that neither advances nor retreats need be frozen by a ceasefire.

D. Deep-seated wounds
Wounds run deep between Ukraine and Russia, both historically and in the present conflict. Panelists identified competing identities, and fears of alienation, loss of status, survival and even genocide. Questions arise as to the survival of leaders, war crimes, compensation, future rights, and who bears the cost of post-war reconstruction.

OUTSIDE INFLUENCE

A. UN Stalemate
While the UN Charter prohibits armed aggression against the territorial integrity of any state, and fear of use of nuclear weapons has been rekindled, the UN Security Council veto essentially prevents the UN as an institution from enabling a clear route to a peace process. There are doubts any significant restructuring can happen quickly. The Uniting for Peace resolution (which can pass recommendations from the General Assembly to the Security Council) is not seen as a viable solution to the veto problem, which is embedded in the UN Charter. Other institutional options may be necessary.

B. International Influence
The shapes of the alliances are not crystal clear. However, it is widely believed that Ukraine cannot hold its ground convincingly without support from external aid from “the West.” Ukraine's degree of resistance seems a surprise to her allies and to Russia as well. Russia, on the other hand, appears at least somewhat reliant on China and India, and to some degree on its ability to continue trade, even during ongoing sanctions. It may be possible for certain states to act as mediators or enablers, or for certain prominent individuals or leaders to play an important role.
**C. USA and NATO intentions**

The US is clearly in the "Western" and NATO group supporting Ukraine. Resources are being provided and many have noted a US influence on Ukraine’s decisions, including through NATO. There are concerns that the US is seeking longer term geopolitical advantage and a weakened Russia. For some there is a perception of NATO “expansion” eastward being a threat; for others there is a perception that NATO is extending protection. The future of Ukraine’s status within the NATO alliance continues to be unclear and is of major concern to Russia. Others see NATO as primarily a defensive organization coming to the aid of Ukraine, and to prevent further Russian expansion.

**D. China intentions**

China presented a 12-point plan for peace and engaged with President Zelensky while still being publicly engaged also with President Putin. However, there are also doubts that China can be a trusted intermediary between the warring parties and their sponsors. China is concerned about a loss of markets for its products in Europe. While some believe China should be pushed to influence Russia, others see China as immune to this pressure. China’s participation is widely seen as positive.

**ABSENT OPTIONS**

**A. Trust and sincere dialogue**

Speakers believed there is no current trust between the Presidents of the conflict parties, and that it will take time and significant effort to build it to a level acceptable for negotiations. At the same time, it was noted that Russia and Ukraine have been involved together in some efforts on a variety of fronts (grain shipments, humanitarian efforts, etc.) even while the conflict is being waged.

**B. Focus on military intervention and arms supply**

A focus on military intervention and military victory alone restricts perspectives of other economic or social interventions, and in particular diplomatic opportunities, humanitarian relief, and conflict resolution as tools building toward an early peace.

**C. Alternative discourses**

Calls for negotiations to end the war should not really be controversial, but there is near silence about peace options. While the threat of the use of nuclear weapons has been mentioned, it is not a primary focus of attention. It can be difficult to gauge public opinion, which has a fundamental role to play, because poll results in the Ukraine and Russia cannot be trusted. Yet, some options remain:

- There is a need to identify the brokers who can negotiate a ceasefire agreeable to both parties;
- It is possible to implement incremental agreements and partial ceasefires even for short periods. This can shift the conflict parties towards dialogue;
- Prisoner exchanges can be arranged;
• Continuance of shipment of grain can be negotiated;
• Humanitarian zones can be established near nuclear power plants, hospitals, schools;
• Protection of farmland can be negotiated with ceasefires enabling time for sowing and harvest;
• Economic pressure can be applied; and
• A future European Security framework can be considered.

OTHER IDENTIFIED RISKS
Although not the focus of the discussion, it became clear that there were many broad issues that are troubling for the peace process. They include:
• Nuclear weapons’ threat escalating into actual nuclear exchange;
• Heightened human suffering;
• Impact of economic sanctions;
• Risk of economic collapse – Ukraine, Russia and more broadly; and
• Deepening psychological wounds, and an erosion of human morality.

Conclusion
The Peace Table focus was on obstacles that might be mitigated to pave the way to a ceasefire. The two-hour session raised a wide range of blockages and impediments, some were acknowledged by all panelists and others were not. Speakers said that, for a variety of reasons, the time was not ripe enough for a ceasefire. However, they agreed there are possible approaches and incremental steps that could be -- and should be -- pursued, and with haste.

Project next steps
The planning committee has agreed to distribute this report, and a supplementary Food for Thought paper, as well as a video.¹

Annexes
Annex A – The Programme, Guest Speakers’ Biographies and Invited Audience
Annex B – The List of Questions From the Audience
Annex C – Planning the session

¹ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u34z1QyEiHs
Annex A

The Programme, Guest Speakers’ Biographies and Invited Audience

Ukrainians and Russians are dying every day, and regional and international suffering is escalating. Infrastructure is being destroyed in Ukraine, and the need for future reconstruction efforts keeps increasing. We observe the calls for punishment of Russia, and for victory for Ukraine, and the extremely worrying threats of, and excuses for, use of nuclear weapons. In this light, Canadian Pugwash Group will host a Civil Society Peace Negotiation Table for Ukraine and Russia, on 27 April 2023, via a zoom meeting. The proposed outcome is a “Food for Thought” paper to be distributed to a broad audience, with a focus on the conflict parties, middle power states, NATO governments and Ambassadors, in addition to Pugwash groups, to encourage peace communication with their civil societies and national press.

**Moderator:** Ernie Regehr, O.C., Co-Founder, Project Ploughshares; Chairperson, Canadians for a Nuclear Weapons Convention; member, Canadian Pugwash Group; author of “Disarming Conflict: Why Peace Cannot Be Won on the Battlefield.”

**Facilitator:** Dr. Sylvie Lemieux, CD, Co-Chairperson, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, CPG member, board member Group of 78, graduate of the Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution.

**Speakers:**

*Sergey Batsanov*, Ambassador Sergey Batsanov is a senior practitioner and scholar in international security, arms limitation and non-proliferation. He has been Director of the Geneva Office of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs since 2005.

*Dr. Maria Levchenko*, Peacebuilding Officer with Peace Action, Training and Research Institute of Romania (PATRIR).

*Wolfgang Sporrer*, Adjunct Professor- Conflict Management, The Hertie School, Berlin/German (OSCE, Minsk Accords)

The programme was as follows:

13h00    Quick welcome – providing 5 minutes for invited guests to join
13h05    Introduction by Moderator
13h17    First Round - 4 guest speakers – 7 minutes each
         Question: What are 2-3 obstacles to stopping the war and getting to a ceasefire?
13h45    Second Round - 4 guest speakers – 5 minutes each
         Question: We have identified obstacles to a ceasefire. Which obstacles, if mitigated, would best pave the way to a ceasefire?
14h05    15 min - quick reaction from panelists on what was shared
14h20    Q&As - consolidator. Robin Collins, Secretary, Canadian Pugwash; Co-Chairperson, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
14h50    Conclusion and Thanks
15h00    Closure

Expert Audience

Bev Tollefson Delong, Former Chairperson, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons; Member, Board of Canadian Pugwash Group.

Dr. Walter Dorn, Professor of Defence Studies, Royal Military College & Canadian Forces College; Member, Board of Canadian Pugwash Group.

Michel Duguay, Laval University, Member, Canadian Pugwash Group.

Kai Brand Jacobsen, President, Romanian Peace Institute (PATRIR)

Peter Jenkins CMG, Chairman, British Pugwash, Experience of Track II diplomacy in the context of the Iranian nuclear problem
Prof. Ellen Judd, Member, Board of Canadian Pugwash Group.

Peggy Mason, former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, President, The Rideau Institute

Paul Maillet, Colonel retired, Centre for Ethics and Peace Services, Accredited Peace Professional, Civilian Peace Service Canada.

Mr. Paul Meyer, former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Adjunct Professor of International Studies and Fellow in International Security, Simon Fraser University

Götz Neuneck, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, German Pugwash Group.

Dr. David Parnas, Peace advocate based in Ottawa.

Prof. John Polanyi, C.C., Prof. John Polanyi, University of Toronto, Member, Canadian Pugwash Group, Nobel Laureate in Chemistry

The Hon. Douglas Roche O.C., former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament; Co-Founder, Canadians for a Nuclear Weapons Convention; Founder, Middle Powers Initiative.

Volodymyr and Anna Romanyuk, Project Manager, Samaritan’s Purse Canada

Ian Small, Senior Advisor, Ukraine Bureau, Global Affairs Canada

Dr. Metta Spencer, Professor Emerita, Univ. of Toronto; Board of Directors (Emerita), Board, Canadian Pugwash Group.

Dr. Tim Street, Secretary, British Pugwash Group

Earl Turcotte, former Canadian diplomat; Past Chairperson, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Olivia Ward, former Foreign Affairs Editor, Toronto Star.

Regrets
Dr. Adele Buckley, Dr. Adele Buckley, physicist, environment engineer; Member Pugwash Council; Past-Chair and Board of Directors (Emerita) Canadian Pugwash
adelle-buckley@rogers.com
**Marius Grinius**, former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, experience in Canadian Forces and Canadian Foreign Service.

**John Guilfoyle**, President, IPPNW-Canada; Member, Steering Committee, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

**Prof. Arnd Jurgensen**, Steering Committee, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

### Biographies of Speakers

**Sergey Batsanov**  
Sergey Batsanov, Director of the Geneva Office of Pugwash Conferences, Former Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament  
Ambassador (ret.) Batsanov is a senior practitioner and scholar in international security, arms limitation and non-proliferation. He served as USSR then Russian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament from 1989 to 1993, after having worked on arms control and disarmament issues in Moscow. He was also a senior member of the secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) from 1993 to 2004. Ambassador Batsanov has been Director of the Geneva Office of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs since 2005.

**Dr. Mariia Levchenko**  
Mariia Levchenko is McCain Global Fellow 2022, Peacebuilding Officer at the Romanian Peace Institute (PATRIR) and European Director of Outreach and Training at the River Phoenix Center for Peacebuilding. She also works as a Researcher for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and Berghof Foundation on the topic of National Dialogue, and its perspectives in the post-war context. In the past, she worked as a Dialogue Facilitation Officer at OSCE. In her work, she educates young people, refugees, and women on themes of “Civic Dialogue and Peacebuilding” and “Fighting Propaganda, Disinformation, and Extremism.” She implements social and emotional learning in education. Her specific expertise revolves around dialogue programs, facilitation, raising awareness, conflict resolution, and trauma healing.

**Wolfgang Sporrer**  
Wolfgang Sporrer is a member of the Adjunct faculty at the Hertie School. He used to head the Human Dimension Department of the OSCE SMM in Kyiv, where he lead the civilian aspects of conflict management and facilitated and promoted dialogue between the opposing sides. Before that, he was the head of the international oil and gas company OMV's representation in the Caspian region, where he spearheaded the regional efforts to promote the Southern Gas Corridor for the EU. Previously, he served as the Head of the Europa House of the European Commission in Baku/Azerbaijan and as the Head of the Democratisation Department of the OSCE Presence in Albania. He also served as a political adviser in the EU delegation in Moscow and in several functions for the OSCE in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. He studied
law at the University of Vienna, the Universite Catholique de Louvain La Neuve and the London School of Economics and Political Science. He also holds a Diploma in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins University SAIS.


**Organizing Committee**

This event was organized by Sylvie Lemieux, Bev Tollefson Delong and Robin Collins, with our gratitude for the generous assistance offered by Ernie Regehr, Adele Buckley and Cesar Jaramillo. We extend our thanks also to our European colleagues in Pugwash Conferences for their assistance.
Annex B

The List of Questions and Comments From the Audience

In the order the questions were asked:

Q1. Anna Romanyuk
Thank you for your very interesting and thoughtful discussion. My question relates to your thoughts on Russia's motives. In light of the discussion of macro geo-politics involved in this war, would you say that the motives of Russia in this war are logical/rational or are they influenced by some personal and maybe not psychologically stable ambitions of the leader. Because the answer to this would greatly affect the possibility of breaking the stalemate

Q2. Peggy Mason
If China and the USA are both engaged as joint mediators, that gives reassurance to both sides to enter ceasefire negotiations without an answer to every big issue in advance. What is the panel’s view on what can be done (civil society, experts, governments like Canada) to convince the US that the best way forward is for the leading patrons of the warring parties, China and the USA, to declare their intention to jointly mediate a negotiated end to the conflict, beginning with a ceasefire negotiation?

Q3. Douglas Roche
What is the panel’s view of an international commission appointed by the U.N. arbitrating Russia-Ukraine disputes? This could be the start of effective diplomacy.

Q4. Peter Jenkins
Is there any reason to think that Ukrainian politicians can ever recognise that since 1991 various Ukrainian policies and practices have contributed to the suffering of the Ukrainian people on which she dwelled so eloquently? Are Ukrainian politicians capable of the self-awareness and consciousness of past mis-steps that are a pre-requisite for success in peace negotiations?

Q5. Tim Street
To Maria and other panellists: what is your view on the status of Crimea in terms of securing a peace deal?

Q6. Anna Romanyuk
Another question: is it realistic to expect, in light of the current situation (acutely polarized as it is), that an honest debate about the current security architecture in Europe, is possible.
Q7. Paul Maillet
As someone working as a peace professional, one has to agree with Wolfgang. First one cannot “pound stakes in the ground and call it negotiation”... Second, the language on non-violent communication NVC is important, an avalanche of emotion, accusations, blame and threats is not helpful, from involved parties at peace tables. And lastly the “skill in questions” construct. Dealing with an intractable question, is usually through the consideration of meta questions, that collectively build to dealing with the intractable one. So as discussed, a permanent architecture of “peace tables” or “humanitarian tables” that involve parties and provide movement “without prejudice to rights or claims” i.e. as pointed out, “Tables” on grain and perhaps on pauses for refugee support, medical and humanitarian aid, prisoner exchanges, maybe safe havens, nuclear plant protection, relentless diplomacy, etc... perhaps for temporary ceasefires getting longer and longer.

I too have been to Ukraine 2014 2015 in OSCE election support. We need to do what we can do and not refuse. Civilized people talk.

Q8 Goetz Neuneck
Question to Sergei: What can offer Russia to stop the war with the support of China and Brazil. Does Putin agree on all point of the PRC peace plan?

Q9. Bev Delong
Prof. Sporrer, to ripen the time for ceasefire you mentioned the need for a “mutually enticing opportunity” for both states. What might that involve?

Q10. Anonymous Attendee
Ms. Batsanov mentioned in the beginning of the talk that the first challenge to a solution is a lack of understanding of each other’s motives. I think it would be useful for the audience to understand, in his view, which are the Russian motives he is referring to: could you please extend on that?

Could both the speakers - Sergey and Mariia - actually describe concretely what peace would mean and look like for them, personally?

Comment. Douglas Roche
The panel is underestimating the role of the U.N. General Assembly through Uniting for Peace resolutions. This somewhat bypasses the Security Council deadlock.

Q11. Kai Brand-Jacobsen
When speaking about peace negotiations is it important to also consider ethical dimensions of peace, and lasting implications for security? When it came to decolonisation, there was no ‘accepted right’ for European nations to invade and occupy other countries. It was acknowledged that to achieve peace,
invading countries had to withdraw and end their occupation. We would not accept a scenario of continuing US occupation of Iraq. While we can state the need for peace in terms of ending violence because of people’s suffering, can this not be used to then legitimise a scenario where Russia is rewarded for its invasion and violation of international law? Should we not be looking for scenarios of peace which involve withdrawal of Russian forces, and holding those accountable for their crimes and invasion? For the future of world peace and security, is it not important to again strengthen the rule of international law and not allow violation of borders and war against neighbouring countries become a norm.

Comment - Peggy Mason
But Ukraine needs to be sure that Russia will live up to the agreement. And China’s involvement as a guarantor can provide some assurance in that regard. So, I disagree that China does not have a role as a guarantor.

With respect, it will be very hard for Ukraine to agree to terms without some assurance that there will be effective guarantees, especially in light of its experience with the Budapest Memorandum. Early on after the invasion, there were negotiations and Ukraine put security guarantees on the table and the US did not engage on it. So, they came up very early.

Comment - David Parnas
In this discussion there has been no mention of the biggest barriers to peace
1) Nobody wants peace. For example, The US shows no sign of wanting peace. Biden’s words about Norther Ireland and Sudan are very different from what he says about Ukraine although they are true of Ukraine. Zelensky’s supporters say that his agreeing to peace would be political suicide.
2) The first 8 years of the war are always ignored by the West. People believe the war started in 2022. There has been fighting in Ukraine since 2013. It has never stopped.
3) Those who speak for peace are labelled traitors.
4) People say that the time for peace has not come yet. Actually, the time is long past.
Annex C

Planning the Session
In the aftermath of the pandemic, webinar sessions began to offer commentary about the Russia-Ukraine war. Our proposed Peace Table needed to be of the right duration to attract a busy audience. A period of two-hours was selected with a focus on only two related questions.

It was hoped we might find voices from Ukraine and Russia and, if possible, also representatives from the European Union and the UN to provide knowledgeable perspectives. Four guest speakers were invited. Providing a safe and open discussion environment was seen as paramount to a successful event. Three simple rules were agreed upon by all members of the panel: Building a common goal of peace, civil communications, and zero blaming. A knowledgeable moderator and a neutral facilitator were chosen, both with expertise in conflict resolution. They had a mandate of ensuring compliance with the agreed peace table structure.

A webinar format was chosen to ensure an uninterrupted session, and a visually pleasing video for later distribution. It was anticipated that not all the questions from the invited guests in the audience would be addressed. A member of the planning committee was responsible for selecting representative questions during the limited 20-minute Q and A timeframe.

The invited audience members were selected from peace community groups and experts with demonstrated interest in a positive solution to the crisis, including an effective ceasefire and ultimately an end to the war.

The planning committee included three individuals who are members of CNANW and Canadian Pugwash Group: Dr. Sylvie Lemieux and Robin Collins, (CNANW Co-chairpersons) and (Ms.) Bev Tollefson Delong (Past Chairperson). In addition, Ernie Regehr and Cesar Jaramillo (Chairperson, CPG) contributed to planning the event.